







	The disjunctivism I wish to discuss is the negative disjunctivist thesis, defended by some naïve realists, according to which hallucinatory visual experiences are understood purely in terms of their indistinguishability from veridical perception.​[1]​  On this view the phenomenal character of such experiences has no positive ontological character.  All that we can say about them is the epistemic fact that they seem no different from veridical perceptions.   The phenomenal character of veridical seeing, on the other hand, is given a positive account.  For in these experiences we are directly related to ordinary material objects in the environment.  On naïve realism, the phenomenal character of visual experience is accounted for by the qualities exhibited by the physical objects of which one is aware.  In this way, visual perception allows the mind to reach out and make direct contact to non-mental reality.   Famously, naïve realism faces the challenge of the argument from hallucination, and disjunctivism is best understood as a strategy designed to counter this particular anti-naïve realist argument.​[2]​    In what follows I will argue that the disjunctivist response to the argument from hallucination is both implausible and unnecessary.   It is implausible because the very phenomenological considerations that provide initial support for naïve realist theories of perception also tell most soundly against the disjunctivist view of hallucination.   It is unnecessary because a consistent phenomenology of perceptual experiences reveals another account of perception that deals with the distinction between hallucination and veridical perception without the peculiar drawbacks, not to say absurdities, of the disjunctivist account. 
1.
Disjunctivist theories of perception arise not from impartial reflection on the character of our experience but from the dialectical need the naïve realist theory has of countering the threat posed by hallucination.  As M.G.F. Martin has put it,  “Disjunctivism about perceptual appearances, as I conceive of it, is a theory which seeks to preserve a naïve realist conception of veridical perception in the light of the challenge from the argument from hallucination”(2006,354)   For Martin the most pressing version of the problem arises when we consider the case of the causally matching hallucination, that is,  the perfect  hallucination that is caused by the same proximate cause as the corresponding veridical perception.​[3]​  According to naïve realism, veridical perceptions are not completely explained by their proximate cause.  Part of what is involved in explaining perception is the ontological fact that the material object is itself a constituent of the experience.   Nevertheless the causally matching hallucination presents a problem.  For in hallucination there is, by hypothesis, no material object that the mind is related to.  Thus it seems that while we may say that veridical perception is something over and above hallucination, we cannot deny the weaker thesis that whatever the neural event causes in the case of hallucination is also present in the veridical case. (Martin, 2009, 369)  The fear is that accepting this will lead to the view that both hallucination and veridical experience share a common element, thereby putting naïve realism in a perilous position.  For if my visual experience as of a desk can be explained, in hallucination and veridical perception, by appeal to a common element that is the result of the proximate neural cause, then appeal to material objects as additional constituents of the genuine perceptual relation looks to be redundant.   To avoid this sort of “screening off” Martin argues that we need to give a purely epistemic account of the common element.  On Martin’s account what the veridical perception and the causally matching hallucination have in common is subjective indistinguishability.   The hallucination is indistinguishable from the veridical perception and, trivially, the veridical perception is indistinguishable from itself.   Crucially, the veridical perception, unlike the hallucination, is constituted by a relation to a real material thing.   This added feature is possible because Martin believes sameness of cause does not require that the effect be the same, it only requires that the “most specific kind of effect” present in hallucination also be present in veridical perception.  Thus if we agree with the disjunctivist account we can allow that the veridical experience shares the most specific effect with the hallucination (veridical experiences are indistinguishable from veridical experiences), and also insist that there is no common element or feature intrinsic to both sorts of experiences.  The argument from hallucination is defeated and naïve realism is preserved. (Martin, 2009, 291)
But at what cost?   Martin’s disjunctivist strategy requires that we adopt an extreme form of skepticism with respect to our knowledge of our mental states.  It is not just that we may be mistaken about the specific character of hallucinatory experiences; it is rather that we can believe we are having an experience with a specific character when that experience has no character at all!   On this view we are not aware of anything when we hallucinate; we are only the state of seeming to have such awareness.  Such empty seemings are strange, and many philosophers have found disjunctivism so conceived a bitter if not impossible pill to swallow.   What I want to focus on first, however, is the tension between disjunctivism and the very methodological considerations that provide the chief justification for naïve realism itself.
2.
Just about everyone admits that naïve realism is the most natural view to take with respect to perceptual consciousness, at least with respect to vision and touch.  It is this view of perception that is taken for granted in everyday life.  Indeed, as J. J. Valberg (1992) has argued many who are persuaded by the argument from hallucination to reject naïve realism nevertheless find themselves afterwards taking the conclusion to be absurd when they become open to experience.   When I look at a book on my desk I naturally take myself to be seeing (directly) the book.  Philosophical considerations such as the argument from hallucination may lead me to conclude that this is not what is present, that I must be aware of something other than a book when I gaze at my desk.    But then, I look back at my desk. What has happened to the book?  It’s still there!   As Valberg recognizes, this sense of absurdity is not itself an argument or counter-argument.  Unlike the disjunctivist strategy it does not purport to undercut the reasoning behind the argument from hallucination.  But it is nevertheless a fact of experience that when I consider the perceptual situation as it seems to me naturally and without prejudice, I find the objects of awareness to be ordinary material things.  The oddness here is only intensified when we consider alternative causal theories.  In the words of Paul Snowdon: “In Perception there is nothing to latch onto other than the world.  In particular there is no such thing as a state produced in us, and which is manifestly distinct from the world, to which we can attend the book.”(2009, 62)  The causal theory requires that the concept of causation is necessarily bound up with that of perception.  But when we look to see what actually happens in the perceptual situation, we find this supposedly crucial causal element strikingly absent.  
  Thus a chief motivation behind the naïve realist view is the felt need to develop a theory that remains true to this fundamental character of our experience.   “[T]he disjunctivist advocates Naïve realism because they think that this position best articulates how sensory experiences seem to us to be just through reflection” (Martin, 2006, 354).​[4]​   It is thus unsurprising that when we look at the dialectical structure of the debate concerning naïve realism we find disjunctivists engaged primarily in a defensive strategy.   Such a strategy is not itself a liability if the aforementioned phenomenological considerations are given sufficient weight.  On the other hand, if we believe phenomenological reflection to be a fundamentally faulty cognitive activity, the case for naïve realism becomes substantially weakened. 
 For how seriously are we taking phenomenology when we adopt the disjunctivist view that hallucinatory experiences have no intrinsic character at all?  Recall that the disjunctivist view I am considering does not merely claim that hallucinations may be different in kind while still being indistinguishable from perception, the claim is that there is no non-epistemic way of characterizing what is presented to the mind in the case of an hallucination at least one if the hallucination is of a “perfectly matching kind.” But this latter qualification only reinforces the bizarreness of the view.  For it is hard to see what would motivate the claim that hallucinatory experiences may have intrinsic characteristics except when they are most vivid and life like, in which cases they are nothing at all.  Consider the different case of imagination.  When I imagine an object I am, at least usually, not confusing it with reality.  And yet when I imagine a horse the imaginative consciousness has some intrinsic content.  It is not a state adequately accounted for by any mere epistemic process.  Or consider the case of dreams.  Arguably dreams either are a kind of hallucination or they are some sort of very deceptive and vivid imaginative consciousness.  Are we really willing to say that there is nothing intrinsic to the dream experience? Or if we do, do we do so only in the confident knowledge that dream objects are not vivid or life like enough to be truly indistinguishable from waking life?  Furthermore, once we grant perfect hallucinations are possible, we must also allow that they may be pervasive.  I may not be a brain in a vat, but if such a brain were to exist all of its experiences would lack intrinsic content, a possibility no less startling or counterintuitive than the brain in a vat hypothesis itself.  It is characteristic of the disjunctive view that hallucinatory consciousness is a derivative consciousness. We can only understand hallucination by reference to its similarity to veridical experience.  Perhaps this is true.  Perhaps the aforementioned possibility of pervasive hallucination is in fact impossible.  But these are substantive and controversial philosophical theses that require argument and support, rather than premises to be taken for granted at the beginning of the philosophical investigation of the nature of perception.   
We can press this point further if we consider an objection to disjunctivism first broached by Howard Robinson (1994, 51). According to the disjunctivist strategy that Martin adopts, what hallucinatory and veridical perceptions have in common is the epistemic fact that each is indistinguishable from the veridical perception.  This fact of indistinguishability explains why a subject’s beliefs and actions may be guided by the hallucination just as it would be in the veridical case.   But if this is so, why should we suppose that there is ever genuine perceptual contact with material objects?  If epistemic seemings explains my beliefs and actions just as well as real contact with objects, could not such seemings function as ersatz sense data and eliminate the need for immediate awareness of the world?    If we allow that the empty seemings of negative disjunctivism can account for what look to be real objects of lived experience in the case of hallucination, what principle prevents us from accounting for all perceptual experience in this way and thereby leave naïve realism behind?
This point may have even more force when we consider the version of disjunctivism developed by William Fish.  Unlike Martin, Fish does not stop with a merely epistemic characterization of the bad disjunct.   According to Fish, when I hallucinate I am in a state that produces the same sorts of cognitive effects as the veridical experience.  These effects are primarily, though not entirely, in the form of beliefs about what one is experiencing.  “A mental event both becomes a hallucination and acquires a felt reality as it has its cognitive effects.  If the effects do not occur then the event will not attain a felt reality, but nor will it qualify (perhaps even, in virtue of this, it will not qualify), as a hallucination.”(Fish, 2009, 100)  Given this broadly eliminativist approach to the phenomenal character of hallucination, why should we suppose that there is ever a need to explain perceptual experience in terms of real immediate awareness of its objects?   If we are willing to ignore phenomenological data and go eliminativist with respect to hallucination, why not go all the way and take an eliminativist approach to the phenomenal character of all perceptual experiences?   Fish is aware of this challenge and confronts it directly:
But because a hallucinating subject will think, do, and say the same things as a subject who perceives veridically,   it may seem that the screening off problem rears its head: could we not therefore explain everything that needs to be explained in the same way, thereby rendering the postulation of a veridical perceptual experience bearing naïve realist phenomenal character explanatorily redundant? (2009, 109)
In response Fish replies that the cognitive effects that constitute hallucinations are, “an inherited or explanatory property.”  The felt reality of a hallucination derives from the hallucinator’s belief that she is having a veridical perception.  “But having such a belief –believing that one’s current mental event is a veridical perception of a certain kind—can be sufficient to account for the felt reality of an event only if there is already a felt reality to the event that the subject judges himself to be in.  Hallucinations have a felt reality because, when we hallucinate, we take ourselves to be perceiving, and perceptions themselves have a felt reality.” (Fish, 2009, 109-110)  The idea seems to be that when I perceive veridically I obtain the concept of perception.  This concept derives from my contact with direct perceptual acquaintance with the world.  Hallucinations can be indistinguishable from such perceptions because in the hallucinatory state we may believe ourselves to be in the veridical state.  But if we were never in the veridical state, we would never have obtained this concept and would therefore not be able to hallucinate.   Once I have the concept of red and balloon and veridical perception I can then be in a state that deceives me into thinking (via “cognitive effects”) that I am aware of an object and that this object has a certain phenomenal character.  
	For myself, I wonder if it is quite so common for a person to get the concept of veridical experience through the having of veridical experiences.  The concept is rather abstract and philosophical and it is likely that many people who can hallucinate have never developed this conception.   It is one thing to have an experience of a rock, and thus get the concept of a rock, quite another to obtain a concept of veridical experience itself from that perception.  The latter requires a degree of reflection and is hardly automatic.  Leaving this minor point aside, Fish’s response does not meet what seems to me to be the most forceful version of the objection.  For the claim to be countered should not be understood as “is it possible that we are always hallucinating?” but rather: is it  possible that the cognitive effects that veridical perception shares with hallucination are the common element that accounts for the apparent phenomenal features of both hallucination and perception proper?   For it might be suggested that we can account for all perceptual experiences, veridical or not, by means of different sorts of belief obtaining processes.  Veridical perception consists in those beliefs being caused in the appropriate way by external things; hallucination consists in beliefs caused in some other, aberrant way.  Such a view is quite at odds with the naïve realist conviction that the phenomenal character of veridical perception involves acquaintance with the properties of material things.   But if we allow that the appearance of phenomenal character can be explained away in hallucination, why not go all the way and explain all such appearances this way?  In other words we can allow that hallucination has a derivative character and also hold that veridical experience consists in the causal acquisition of certain kinds of beliefs.  The natural and plausible response to this sort of view is its phenomenological absurdity.  But it’s hard to see how one can make this move while in the same breath denying that the apparent phenomenal character of hallucination cannot likewise be explained away.  Indeed when one looks at Armstrong’s early defense of the causal/belief producing theory of perception, we find him first applying the theory to hallucination and illusion and only later applying it to perception as such. (Armstrong, 1961)
3.
So far I have argued that the naïve realist who is also a disjunctivist is committed to a kind of methodological inconsistency.  The very phenomenology that supports the naïve realist view of the “good” disjunct undercuts the same theories view of the” bad” one.   But what of the claim that disjunctivism is necessary to preserve naïve realism from the threat posed by hallucination?  Can the threat be avoided in some way that does not lend itself to phenomenological absurdity?  I think it can.
It is often taken for granted that if we agree that hallucinatory experiences have some sort of positive quality, it will be a quality anathema to naive realism.   It is thus assumed that if we give an account of hallucination, the non-veridical character of the experience will consist of replacing the physical character of the apparent object with either a mental object or a non-relational mental state.  But this is hardly what phenomenological reflection reveals when we consider the case of the phenomenologically indistinguishable hallucination.  If we go just by the character of the experience itself, the object is just as much a physical object as the one present in veridical perception.  To use a familiar example, Macbeth’s hallucinated dagger is just as much an object as a real dagger.  How can Macbeth ask, “Is this a real dagger?” if there is no object present to him?  Hallucination, like veridical perception, is best analyzed in the act/object way as a relation between subject and object.    There is no need to suppose that in the case of hallucination this object is mental.   If I am having a visual experience of something, such as a green balloon, I find myself aware of an object that is distinct from me and that exhibits properties such as color and shape.  If I attend simply to the experience, this is what I find.  Learning the experience is a hallucination does not change any of this.    If we assume with naïve realism that physical properties include those that are revealed in physical object perception, the balloon exhibits physical properties.  It thus cannot be a mental item and is not miraculously transformed into one if one supposes the experience is hallucinatory.  Instead of supposing that the unreality of the object consists in its ontological location (in the mind or without) we can just as easily think of its unreality as consisting in nothing other than the fact that it, this green balloon, is unreal or non-existent.   
	 For many philosophers, this sort of Meinongian account of hallucination can be dismissed with just a few lines that include the phrase, “ontological extravagance.”   But the question we should ask first is: what view is most consistent with the phenomenology of perception?  Naïve realists insist that perception is a real relation in which the subject comes into direct contact with a material object.  This, they say, is the only theory of perception that makes it something other than an error theory that denies perception is as it seems to be.  A consistent application of this method should lead to similar results in the case of hallucination.  If hallucinations seem to be awarenesses of objects with physical qualities, then should we not take the naïve view of hallucination just as we do of veridical perception?   Odd as they may seem, non-existent objects do not bring with them phenomenological absurdity.   On the contrary, it is only by positing non-existent objects that we can have a theory of hallucination that captures most closely what such experiences seem to be.    
	But what does it mean to say that hallucinatory objects do not exist?   Obviously to say this is not to commit oneself to saying that there exist things that do not exist.  It is not to say that these objects have some other kind of watered down form of existence.  Rather it is simply a way of picking out a class of object that we can single out in non-veridical perceptual consciousness in just the same way as we do with respect to existent objects.    Just as, on naïve realism, veridical perception includes the object of perception as a constituent of the perceptual situation (the object side of the act/object relation), so too on the view I am defending hallucinatory experience also is genuinely relational, it just so happens that one of the relata is an object that does not exist.  The key underlying principle is that the ontology of hallucinatory experience should mirror the phenomenology.   I believe the Meinongian view I am outlining not only best captures this common element between these two sorts of experience but also does so without undercutting the naïve realist theory.  Furthermore, while the objects of hallucinatory consciousness do not exist, these objects nevertheless have existent properties and relations.   The purple sphere is really purple and spheroid as well as really being the object component of the act/object relation.   It is natural to find non-existent objects puzzling, but it is important to bear in mind that this puzzle is not the superficial result of wild philosophical theorizing, but instead grounded in the very character of perceptual consciousness itself. 
	While I think phenomenological considerations ought to be the chief guide for any account of various modes of consciousness, I am not committed to the view that such phenomenological reflection is infallible.  It is therefore open to a critic to argue that the results of phenomenological reflection can be overturned by other powerful bits of evidence.   This is the strategy adopted by Mathew Soteriou as a way of defending disjunctivist varieties of naïve realism.   Soteriou agrees that introspective evidence plays a special role “grounding claims we make about the phenomenal character of our experience.” (2005, 183)    But because this special role is not an infallible one, he believes that in the case of hallucination we can and do find defeaters for the warrant introspection gives us for thinking there is an object present to consciousness.  We discover such a defeater when we acknowledge the consequence of accepting the belief that “the content of experience is particular and not purely general”(183) Granting this assumption, Soteriou argues that we have very good non-introspective evidence that the experience a person has in hallucination is different in kind from an indistinguishable veridical perception.   Roughly, the idea is that if one is hallucinating and knows it, one knows that there is no object before one and therefore cannot without psychological gymnastics (self-deception or “bracketing”) make judgments about the objects present (188).  It should be clear by now that however effective this line of reasoning may be against some critics of disjunctivism, it bears no weight against the Meinongian who holds that we can and do refer to non-existent objects.   To say that for perception to be object involving requires that the object in question exists simply begs the question. 
	Nevertheless, one might think that there has got to be a way of accounting for the phenomena without adopting a Meinongian point of view.  One such attempt is found in a recent book by Jody Azzouni (2010).     While Azzouni denies any ontological role for non-existent objects, he also agrees with the Meinongian that when someone has an hallucinatory experience of, let us say, a hobbit, the description of the experience the hallucinator gives, “I am visually aware of a hobbit” is true and does not require any sort of Russell style re-interpretation.   But instead of saying that this statement’s truth is grounded in an immediate awareness of an object, he argues that we can account for its truth by appealing to what he calls “Truth-value inducers” which consist entirely of things that do exist.   Azzouni introduces this notion with an example from arithmetic, on which he assumes a decidedly nominalist view.   When it comes to the truth of 2+2=4, “[t]he truth-value inducers are  a “blend of the (relevant) objects that do exist—us, our language, and our epistemic status included—and that jointly yield the indispensability of the truth of “2+2=4,” to our assertoric practices in ordinary life and our sciences.”(18)  The objects 2 and 4 don’t exist and therefore play no role in accounting for the truth of the statement.   
Azzouni also uses this notion of truth-value inducers dealing with hallucination.   He does this by introducing a distinction between “awareness, e”   and “awareness. r “  When we hallucinate, our awareness of an object is awareness,e  whereas in veridical perception our awareness is awareness.r  (106)  Unfortunately Azzouni does not explicitly explain the use of these subscripts in the case of “awareness,” so we must look to see what he says when discussing the corresponding varieties of reference.    For Azzouni, while referencer is a real relation to an existing object, referencee is not a relation but rather a characterization of “certain terms (names, quantifiers, etc.) when such play a certain role in discourse: have grammatical and semantic roles in sentences indistinguishable from otherwise referential terms”(24).   Referencee is what is going on when we refer to things that don’t exist.  While statements about such apparent reference can be literally true or false, their truth value does not depend on what they are about (which is the Meinongian view), but depends instead on truth-value inducers.  This theory of reference may have application in some circumstances.   Unlike Meinong and some Meinongians I am not confident that we need to posit impossible objects such as round squares to account for the truth of “Round squares are impossible.”    But the account is of no help at all when we try to account for the character of hallucinatory experience.   The problem is not, in the first instance, what explains the truth of assertions about experience.  The prior and more fundamental question lies in trying to explain the ontological character of the experience that the statement purports to be about. ​[5]​  The color and shape of the purple sphere I hallucinate are given in the experience itself.   It is this givenness that explains fundamentally why we need to acknowledge that the object of hallucination have properties.  
The account of hallucination I am proposing centrally includes an affirmation of an act/object or relational theory of perceptual consciousness.  But it might be thought that the notion of a real relation between consciousness and a Meinongian object is metaphysically incoherent.  How can there be a real relation between the existing consciousness and a non-existent object?  How can non-existent objects stand in any real relation at all?​[6]​  There are a whole slew of relations that cannot obtain with respect to non-existent objects.   I cannot be five feet away from a golden mountain, nor can I climb it.  I cannot kick a non-existent ball and I cannot live on the same planet as Frodo Baggins.  If we take perceptual experience to be a relation like these, we must conclude that we cannot have a real and direct relation to non-existent objects.   Real relations require real relata and non-existent objects are not real.  
But what reasons are there for holding that perception is a relation like kicking or climbing? To be sure, on some accounts the real relation consciousness has to its object is akin to Russellian acquaintance and it is the nature of such acquaintance to guarantee the existence of its objects.  But this is not the only model available to us.  From the fact that there are some relations existent things (such as my body) cannot have with non-existent objects it does not follow that there can be no real relation between consciousness and non-existent objects. The plausibility of the act/object account of perception is not based on some other relation a person may have to the objects of perception, it is based rather on the phenomenological datum that in perception I find myself confronted by an object.  It is this immediate presence of the object that makes perception a real relation, and because hallucinatory objects can also have this presence, the relation to them is equally real.  Furthermore, it strikes me as a serious mistake to try to model the unique and distinctive relational character of consciousness to other more mundane relations.  Prima facie, consciousness presents all sorts of unique and distinctive features.      We should hardly be surprised, then, if the relational character of consciousness turns out to be quite different ontologically ordinary relations that obtain among or between material objects.
  It is worries such as these that provide a chief motivation for adopting an intentionalist theory of perceptual consciousness.    But at least on standard models of intentionalism, it is hard to see how such accounts accommodate the phenomenological givenness of the hallucinatory object.   Take for example Tim Crane’s account of what it means to say that mental states have intentional objects when, in reality, there are no objects:
When I say ‘some intentional objects do not exist’, I do not mean there are some real but non-existent, intentional objects.  Rather, I mean that there are intentional states that can be truly described as being about ‘about Pegasus’, ‘about unicorns,’ etc.—and it is not the case that there is anything corresponding to these quoted words.  The words have no reference: there are no unicorns, and no Pegasus.  Nothing:  not a non-existent but real thing, just nothing.  (Crane, 2001, 25)
Crane clarifies what he has in mind here when he draws the distinction between what he calls the substantial and schematic conception of an object. (14)  The substantial conception of an object has ontological weight.  Ordinary material things, non-physical minds, abstract objects such as numbers or universals are each possible examples of substantial objects. When the Platonist says “there are mathematical objects” she is making the claim that such objects are part of reality, part of the “furniture of the world.”  Likewise when the dualist claims there are material objects and non-physical minds, he is making another claim, a claim about reality.  In contrast, the schematic conception of an object has no ontological implications.  Crane draws an analogy with grammar.   “The object of the sentence ‘Vladimir ate a banana’ is the banana, the object of the sentence ‘the directors threw a party’ is a party, the object of the sentence ‘the object of the sentence Anna and Bert made a verbal agreement’ is a verbal agreement; but there should be no puzzlement about the idea that the grammatical category object contains such things as bananas, parties, and verbal agreements.”  (16)  What makes a grammatical object an object is not anything about its nature but the role it has in a sentence.  
  Crane is clear he does not think we can understand intentional objects as parasitic on grammatical objects.  His point is that intentional objects, like grammatical objects, don’t have what he calls “a nature.”   They are not entities and they do not have properties.  What are they then?   “They are that upon which the mind is directed when in an intentional state.” (17)   While the word “directed” sounds like some sort of relation between the mind and the object, Crane is clear that he does not think such a relation obtains.  What is the case, however, is that when we reflect and describe our experience reference to non-existent objects is indispensable.  This, I take it, is what Crane means when he says that the idea of an intentional object is a phenomenological idea that “emerges in the process of reflecting on what mental life is like” (17).  So it appears that Crane’s view is that there are indispensable elements found in the phenomenological description of experience that have no ontological ground at all.  Once again, as in the case of negative disjunctivism, we find ourselves confronted with a view in which the ontology fails to adequately match the phenomenology. As Crane later makes clear, he thinks the structure of intentional consciousness includes a relation between the subject, a mental content, and a mode of presentation (such as thinking or perceiving). There is no fourth element, the object, present in the ontological characterization of the experience.  If we assume, as I have, that the ontology of experience must adequately capture what is present in the phenomenology, the intentionalist view, to the extent that it does not do this, must be found wanting.  
What I want to do is agree with Crane that non-existent objects are not entities. They don’t exist, and yet deny that it follows from this that they have no nature, that is to say, no properties.   While this jars ontological sensibilities, it is really simply a way of bringing into ontology genuine objects of reference that not a part of the real world.  It is a sort of ontological classification system, if you will, that is broad enough to take into account what does not exist.  Many philosophers have agreed with Meinong that reality extends beyond the realm of what he calls the existent, that is, particulars that are in time.  Numbers and universals would be standard examples of these sorts of things, as well as states of affairs, which correspond roughly to what Meinong calls “objectives.”  What motivates the move beyond this classificatory schema is the apparent fact that we can refer to things that don’t exist.  The hallucinatory pink rat in the corner is not an abstract object.   It is not like a number or a proposition.  Nor is it an existing particular thing.   Meinong tells us he once thought we should designate such objects as having Quasisein (Meinong, 1960, 84).   But at the time of writing “The Theory of Objects,” Meinong came to view the object as such as neither a being nor a non-being but as indifferent to being, as Ausserseind. (86)  The idea is that neither existence nor nonexistence is present in the object as that object is given to consciousness.  When we are presented with an object, we are presented with an object that “has a claim to being,” that is to say, which may have being or may not.  But prior to any judgment about whether or not an object exists, it must first be referred to, it must first be presented in some way to the mind.   To assume that if an object is present to consciousness it must therefore exists is to deny this fairly basic fact of cognitive experience.  Such a denial is what leads philosophers to various sorts of elaborate re-interpretations of experience that leave phenomenology behind in favor of metaphysical parsimony and, perhaps, “a robust sense of reality.”  The theory of objects that Meinong developed was a way of trying to return to the phenomena and give us an unfiltered view of the character of conscious reference.    
While Meinong’s focus is quite general my only concern here is to argue for a Meinongian account of hallucination.  I take it that this sort of perceptual experience presents the clearest phenomenological case for the giveness of an object.   This is why I have said that, contra Meinong, there are truths that we can know about  the “object” in a loose grammatical sense, when there really is no object (as in the famous example of the round square).  But my reason for questioning this derives not, obviously, from a general reluctance to countenance the non-existent, but from the fact that as far as I can ascertain, when I try to think of round square there is no object singled out before my mind at all.​[7]​
Perhaps a proponent of the intentionalist theory will insist that it is a mistake to describe hallucination as a case of a subject being really confronted with an object (as we might say of veridical perceiving).  Would we not rather say of the hallucinatory subject that she only takes herself to be confronted by an object?  But this response confuses what we would say about a person undergoing what we know or believe to be an hallucination and how the hallucinatory subject experiences it.  Even when we describe our own dreams we often speak using the same perception words we do when we are recounting a veridical experience.  “I saw my father in my dream.”   After we wake up we add the proviso “in my dream” but this is not usually the case while we are dreaming.   Using the “takes himself” locution is valuable insofar as it makes clear that the object or objects in question don’t exist, but is also misleading when we are trying to capture the intrinsic character of the experience as it is happening.   “There were bugs, bugs all over me, I was terrified” may describe a real occurrence, but is also the most direct and truthful way of describing the intrinsic character of the hallucinatory experience.  It may be that using the other locution, saying “I took myself to be covered in bugs” is infelicitous because it understates the force and vivacity of the original experience. 
The difficulties inherent in the intentionalist view may lead some philosophers to prefer a return to the earlier sense-datum theory.  One might think that this sort of theory has the advantage of retaining object relatedness in hallucination and yet avoiding the seemingly paradoxical category of non-existent objects.  But what are sense data—how are we to understand them, ontologically?  It would seem that they would constitute a distinctive type of particular quite different in kind than material objects. But if this is so, then the intrinsic qualities sense data present themselves as having would not be physical properties but something else.  Since hallucinatory consciousness presents us with properties that, given naïve realism, are also properties of material things, the sense-datum approach to hallucination not only invites the possibility of “screening off” but seems to require it.  If the properties of sense data are themselves not physical (because sense data are not themselves physical things), then it is hard to see how we can understand the properties we are aware of in ordinary veridical perception as genuinely physical properties, which naturally suggests that the objects we are aware of in the veridical case are not actually physical things.  The advantage of the Meinongian approach is that in both the hallucinatory and the veridical case, perceptual consciousness presents us with the same kind of thing, a physical object.  It just so happens that in the hallucinatory case this object does not exist.   




In his interesting paper, “The Obscure Object of Hallucination” (2009), Mark Johnston develops a view of hallucination that may be thought of as a chief rival of the Meinongian account outlined here.  Johnston agrees that hallucination and perception are each best understood in terms of the act/object model of understanding consciousness.   He agrees that we must give a positive account of the phenomenological data when describing hallucination.    Yet Johnston balks at conceiving of hallucination as consisting of an awareness of non-existent objects.   Instead, he holds that the object of awareness in the case of hallucination consists of an array of uninstantiated universals.
	   One of Johnston’s claims about hallucination is that, unlike perception, hallucination can never provide us with “the original source of de re thought” about things.    They do not “Introduce new topics for thought and reference” (221).   Thus Johnston agrees with those who consider hallucination to be a fundamentally derivative form of consciousness with respect to individuals. We can hallucinate real individuals, but only if we have prior veridical perception of them.  On the other hand, Johnston insists that hallucinations can be the source of reference and knowledge of  properties,  giving as one piece of evidence the fascinating example of  supersaturated red—a kind of red that we can only be aware of when we are hallucinating.
	If we consider purported cases of hallucinating and then later perceiving real things, this position has a certain degree of plausibility.  I can describe a dreamed person as being the same person as the one I later meet, but I can also say that the person in the dream merely resembled the actual human being.​[9]​  But what Johnston appears to ignore is the possibility that we can come by means of hallucination to think and refer to non-existent things.  Suppose someone has a vivid hallucination of winged horse and calls it Pegasus.  We can think and refer to Pegasus just as easily as we can think and refer to Secretariat.  Of course we can come to refer to non-existent objects by means other than hallucination, such as imagination or fictional representations.  The more general metaphysical case for non-existent objects relies precisely on the analogy between the way we refer to existent and non-existent objects​[10]​.    
 Interestingly, Johnston himself provides a vivid example of such reference to non-existent objects.  In the film A Beautiful Mind, the character of Nash comes to Princeton and meets his roommate, Charles.  Charles, as Nash comes to later recognize, does not exist.  Yet Nash has no trouble referring to him.  In one poignant seen in the movie Nash confronts another hallucinatory person, Charles’ niece and says to her “you’re not real.”   In each of these cases Nash appears to be making reference to hallucinatory persons in quite the same manner as he does to his (existing) wife or other real persons in the movie.   Thus the film presents us a vivid way of recognizing how hallucinatory experience can provide us with original reference to non-existent objects.  Insofar as such a film can provide us with evidence for philosophical argument, it seems to argue for non-existent objects and against Johnston’s view that the name “Charles” as used by Nash “denotes nothing at all.” (250)
Johnston draws this other lesson by focusing on the fact that Charles is taken by Nash at first to be real and existent, and later to be unreal.  According to Johnston:
The Meinongian strategy is to identify the object of hallucination with a non-existent object with just the properties that the hallucinating subject is inclined to predicate on the strength of his hallucination. When it comes to Charles we can fairly ask whether the property of being real or the property of being unreal is to be bundled into the property characterization of Charles.  Neither will do as the exclusion of the other; instead what we intuitively want when it comes to Charles is an “object’ that is first real and then unreal” (250).   
The flaw in this reasoning is that it treats “existence” as a phenomenal property that is revealed in the objects one is aware of perceptually.    For while we can certainly believe that the objects we perceive are existent, such objects never manifest their existence to us.   Existence is not a property we can discover by means of phenomenological reflection on the objects of experience.   If it were otherwise then the very idea of a perfect hallucination becomes suspect and skepticism about the external world becomes amenable to an easy and secure refutation.    In both hallucination and perception we have a real relation between subject and object.  Qua experience there is no intrinsic difference and acknowledging this explains both how perfect hallucinations are possible and how it is that they may possess the same proximate cause.   There is then a common element to both hallucination and veridical perception. But since this common element is not an inner mental state but a real and direct relation to an object, the threat posed by the argument from hallucination is deposed of without sacrificing what is revealed by the phenomenological data.  
I also think that Johnston’s choice of terminology helps blur the distinction between what someone believes about an object and what properties the object is given as having.  When Johnston writes that hallucinatory objects, on the Meinongian view, have whatever properties the hallucinating subject is inclined to “predicate on the strength of the hallucination,” he makes it appear as if the Meinongian is committed to holding that hallucinatory objects have whatever properties the subject believes them to have.  But there is a big difference between believing that Charles exists and Charles presenting the property of being existent.   The fact that Nash believes Charles to be existent no more makes Charles existent than the fact that Macbeth believes a dagger is before him demonstrates there is a genuine dagger there with.  As A.D. Smith has pointed out, what Macbeth hallucinates cannot be a dagger.   For one thing, in order to be a dagger such an object would have to have properties such as the ability to rend flesh  that no hallucinated object can have.   The property “being a dagger” is not one that we can simply read off from the properties of a seen or hallucinated object.   The situation is the same as that with real life fake daggers.   Whether the object in question is a real dagger, a hallucinatory dagger, or a clever toy store replica of a dagger, does depend on what properties the object that is perceived has, but there is no need to suppose that these properties are phenomenally present in the object. (Smith, 2002, 264-265) 
 The case of daggerhood parallels that of existence:   Whether an object exists or not is not a property that is ever present in the external objects insofar as we are aware of them.    As such, the fact that someone who hallucinates an object may change his mind about whether the object is real or not is no more a threat to an object theory of hallucination than the fact that someone may change their mind about whether the object  is really a dagger or not..  The change is in the beliefs of the subject about the object, not in the object the subject is aware of.  
This being said, it is instructive to contrast this broadly Meinongian account of hallucination with Johnston’s own positive view.    Consider two cases.    In the one case, I am veridically perceiving a ball on a desk; In the other I am hallucinating.  According to Johnston in the first case I am aware of an object that instantiates the properties I perceive, in the second I am aware of what Johnston calls a “sensible profile” consisting of uninstantiated universals and relations.   In this way Johnston believes he can acknowledge the phenomenological fact that we are aware of objects in hallucination, without supposing they are non-existent objects.  Instead they are existent, but uninstantiated, universals. (230)
This view has the advantage of allowing us to understand how hallucination can provide us with de re reference to properties as well as provide a way of giving a positive account of the phenomenal character of hallucination without  sacrificing the act/object analysis of perceptual awareness.   One worry that Johnston acknowledges is that the behavior of non-existent objects such as afterimages that seem to move across one’s visual field seem to count against his view.   Uninstantiated universals, in a word, do not move.  In response Johnston claims that the apparent motion of the afterimage consists in the subject simply taking or construing the experience in a certain way.  What is “really there”—the primary object of hallucination independent of subjective construals is a temporal series of distinct complexes of universals.   But this move looks ad hoc to me.   If we understand hallucination in terms of complexes of uninstantiated properties, then we ought, as Johnston says, adopt this view of the moving afterimage.  But the surface phenomenology supports this account of afterimage motion no more than it does in the case veridically perceiving moving billiard balls.
The chief difficulty of Johnston’s view is not the special case of motion but the more general point that a person who hallucinates is aware of one or more particulars.  If I see a red afterimage I can pick it out in my mind and refer to it.   If I hallucinate a snake on my desk, I can refer to it and pick it out just as easily as I can in the case of a real life snake.  I don’t just refer to a set of properties; I refer to this—this snake here.   Contrary to Johnston, there is no difficulty individuating which object I am hallucinating.  The object I am hallucinating is that one—the one that is an ontological constituent of my perceptual experience.   Johnston may balk at the example of the snake, considering it to be a secondary object of hallucination one that has in addition to its sensible features a certain interpretation imposed upon it by the subject. But the same case can be made with the hallucination of a round sphere.  It, too, is just as much available an object of possible reference as any particular existing sphere I happen to perceive.  In hallucination we are presented with the same particularity of the objects as is the case in veridical perception.  To deny this would be to engage in another variety of phenomenological inconsistency.  Naïve realists often contend that only their view of perception can make sense of our ability to easily refer to physical particulars.   Since such ease of reference is also apparently there in the case of hallucination, the most phenomenologically consistent position is one that allows that here, too, we have an immediate awareness of objects.
Another way of making the same point is to consider an analogy with Frank Jackson’s famous critique of the adverbial theory (1975).  According to Jackson, adverbialism fails because the same adverbial description applies to two quite distinct perceptual states.  Thus the adverbial state sensing triangle-ly, redly, squarely, bluely is compatible with sensing a blue square and a red triangle and sensing a red square and a blue triangle.  The analogy with Johnston is this:  If what we are aware of in a hallucinatory experience is a complex of universals, such a complex is compatible with any number of different, incompatible descriptions.  Just given that I am aware of “blue” and “square” does not guarantee that I am aware of a blue square.  If one of the relations is “to the left of” then the description of the complex is compatible with red- triangle to the left of blue-square and blue square to the left of red triangle.  Johnston’s natural retort to this sort of critique is to follow the adverbialists in insisting that the complex of properties ought not to be understood atomistically.  The properties being linked together in specific ways is included amongst the universals one is aware of.   Indeed it seems that on Johnston’s view the whole hallucinatory expanse can be understood as one big complex uninstantiated universal.  And yet when we describe such universals, we need to do so by appealing to language that picks out particulars:  This red triangle is to the left of this blue square.  Once again we find that hallucination, no less than veridical experience, requires irreducible relation to particulars.
  Johnston also makes two more points that I would like to discuss.  First, he asks us to step back and reflect on the manner or way the objects of perception appear to us.  This sort of phenomenological reflection reveals, according to Johnston, nothing other than “a complex of sensible qualities and relations.”(2009, 230) But this seems to me to mis-describe the situation. What I am aware of is the way certain objects are given to me.  I cannot divorce the manner of presentation from the object so presented.  The qualities I am aware of perceptually are by their very nature particularized.  It is, again, this green sphere over here, not “greenness” and “spherehood.”  In saying that in hallucination one is aware of an object, rather than a set of universals, one is doing nothing more than acknowledging the particularity of hallucinatory as well as veridical perception.  Furthermore, experience is usually not, in the first instance, focused on properties but rather on objects.   I see my tennis racket.  Of course the tennis racket has properties, but the attention or focus often is not on the properties but on the individual.   As I see it, the difference between Johnston’s view and the Meinongian view is that the Meinongian view is able to easily account for the apparent particularity of hallucinatory consciousness.   In calling the objects of, hallucination “objects” we are doing justice to the fact that hallucinatory consciousness, like ordinary perception, is consciousness of particulars.  Johnston’s second point is this
But the opponent is here trying to hold to an unstable stopping point.  For it is contingent that the scene before you is the way it looks to you to be.  You could be aware of the complex of sensible qualities and relations without that whole complex being instantiated.  In the minimal case you could be suffering a local illusion, say a Muller-Lyer illusion to the effect that two lines before you are unequal.  Then the complex of sensible qualities and relations will not itself be instantiated, even though many components in the complex will be instantiated.  In the extreme case, in which you are enjoying a full-blown, phantasmagoric hallucination, none of the qualities or relations will be instantiated.  (Johnston, 230-231)
  In the illusory case, it is assumed that the illusory qualities are not instantiated in the object (after all the  Muller-Lyer lines are not really unequal) and  the case is then made that we should generalize from this case of illusion to that of the full blown hallucination.  Thus hallucination is but the extreme end of a continuum that begins with modest perceptual distortions.   While the issue of perceptual illusion is beyond the purview of this paper, one natural counter-argument is to deny the first step.   For we can view illusory properties not as free floating  uninstantiated universals but rather as properties of the object perceived, albeit ones that only appear in special or unusual circumstances.  One way of motivating this idea comes from considering the great variety of different perspectival viewings an object may have.  Such distortions (if that what they be) are a pervasive part of our visual experience.  If the objects of vision have only one visual shape and one visual size and one visual color, the vast majority of our perception, even those under optimum normal conditions, will be filled with uninstantiated universals accounting for the every variety of perceptual distortion.   		
5
		In this paper I have outlined what I take to be the most phenomenologically feasible account of hallucinatory visual experiences.   In the process, I have been making certain common sense assumptions such that while sometimes people are aware of existent objects, in other, rarer, instances a person may be visually aware of an object that does not exist.  I have also assumed, along with most other writers on this topic, that it is possible that the object of hallucination be phenomenologically indistinguishable from veridical visual perception.  On the account I have provided, the difference between hallucinatory and veridical seeing is accounted by appealing to the ontological status of the object that is given to one.  Hallucinatory experience presents one with a non-existent object and veridical experience presents one with an object that exists.  An important question that I have left out is what accounts for the difference between existent and non-existent objects?   What is it that accounts for the existence or non-existence of any object?  On this most fundamental metaphysical question I have only made the modest negative claim that whatever it is for an object to exist, it is not a feature phenomenologically given to the perceiver.   Because existence is never present in an external object of perception, the Meinongian view of hallucination is able to account for the phenomenal character of both veridical and non-veridical perceptions without undermining the cogency of a naïve realist theory of visual consciousness.
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^1	 1   I will focus on the case of visual perception, leaving to one side the question whether analogous accounts can be given to the other senses.
^2	  Another chief obstacle in naïve realism’s path is illusion.  But in this case the defensive disjunctivist strategy is less clear and disjunctivists themselves differ on whether illusions count as aberrant forms of veridical perception or to be lumped together with hallucinations in the non-veridical disjunct.
^3	  This version of the argument from hallucination is most fully developed by Robinson (1994) ch. 6.
^4	  Another motivation for naïve realism lies in the belief that only such a theory can adequately account for our ability to refer to particular objects in our environment, a point developed by Campbell (2002) and Johnston (2006)
^5	  In one section of the book, Azzouni develops the idea that while hallucinated objects don’t have properties, they do nevertheless present them. But even here, he makes clear that his inquiry is really about how we talk or think about experience.  “[D]espite appearances, no questions of the form, `what properties do hallucinated objects actually have and which ones do they actually only present?’ are being raised, a kind of indispensable discourse is being investigated and it’s being considered how such a discourse is to be rendered consistent with the rest of our discourse (85-86).
^6	  I am thankful to an anonymous referee for raising this objection.
^7	  Interestingly,  Adam Pautz has argued against item presentation in perceptual consciousness by appealing to purported cases in which one is perceptually aware of an impossible object such as the waterfall illusion.  But another response to the phenomenological datum is to agree with Meinong that the impossibility of such objects does not preclude their being present to consciousness. (Pautz (2010), 287)
^8	  I am thankful to Brendan Murdray for raising this this objection.
^9	  For a detailed discussion of the application of the concept of identity to objects that seem to occur both in dreams and waking life, see Valberg (2007) ch.2.  
^10	   Some relatively recent defenses of non-existent objects can be found in Butchvarov (1979), Parsons (1980), McGinn (2000),  and Priest (2005)
